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Abstract
For 51 years, the physical presence rule has hampered states in collecting sales and use
taxes from sellers with no property or personnel within state borders. The U.S. Supreme Court
established this rule in 1967 in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of the State
of Illinois, based on the formalistic Due Process Clause and dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence of that time, under which states had no authority to tax interstate commerce.
However, in 1992, the Court upheld the physical presence rule under the dormant Commerce
Clause in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, notwithstanding dramatic changes in dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the economy. On June 21, 2018, the Supreme Court
rejected the physical presence rule in South Dakota v. Wayfair as anachronistic, unfair, and out
of touch with the modern economy. This change will finally allow states to collect sales and use
tax from remote sellers.
Keywords: state tax, sales tax, use tax, physical presence, remote seller, remote sale, Internet
sale, interstate commerce, dormant Commerce Clause, due process, Bellas Hess, Quill, Wayfair.
Introduction
States have long had their hands tied in collecting sales and use taxes1 from out-of-state
sellers that use the Internet and mail order to reach customers inside of their state. For over 50
years, the U.S. Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence2 has required that an
out-of-state seller have a “physical presence” through tangible or real property or personnel
within the borders of the state for the state to have the authority to impose sales taxes or the
requirement to collect use taxes on the seller.3 While the physical presence rule may not have
1

Sales taxes and use taxes are a complementary system states employ to collect as a tax a percentage of sales made
to customers in-state. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., No. 17-494 (June 21, 2018) (slip opinion) at 7. Sellers are
required to collect the sales tax at the time of sale from the customer and remit it to the state. Id. If the seller does not
collect the sales tax, the customer is required to pay use tax, an amount equal to the sales tax, directly to the state. Id.
However, consumer compliance with use tax requirements is “notoriously low.” Id., citing GAO, “Report to
Congressional Requesters: Sales Taxes, States Could Gain Revenue from Expanded Authority, but Businesses Are
Likely to Experience Compliance Costs,” GAO-18-114, at 5 (Nov. 2017).
2
The Commerce Clause grants Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. Const.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The dormant Commerce Clause, though not an express part of the Commerce Clause, is a judicially
created doctrine that prevents states from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce. See Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1, 199-205, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (first recognizing the power of states to regulate and tax subject
to limitation of burdening interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause). The courts have interpreted the
dormant Commerce Clause to mean that states cannot impose taxes or take any other action that will interfere or
discriminate against commerce among the states. (Howsare 2017)
3
The physical presence rule appears to have been limited to the collection of sales and use taxes. The Supreme
Court has not applied the physical presence rule to other types of state taxes and has also not accepted certiorari in
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had a major effect on sales and use tax revenues collected by states 50 years ago when the mail
order industry was limited and the Internet did not exist, the increasing growth of commerce by
remote sellers, 4 particularly due to the explosive development of Internet sales, has exponentially
increased the physical presence rule’s negative impact on state’s tax revenues. (Thimmesch
2011/2012)
That all changed on June 21, 2018 when the Supreme Court issued its opinion in South
Dakota v. Wayfair.5 In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the physical presence rule and
overturned the two cases responsible for its long life, National Bellas Hess v. Department of
Revenue of the State of Illinois,6 and Quill Corporation v. North Dakota.7 In Wayfair, the
Supreme Court recognized states’ sovereignty and authority to tax remote sellers doing
substantial business with customers inside state borders and restored equity to the application of
sales and use taxes on both in state and remote sellers. The Court’s rejection of the physical
presence rule will allow states to dramatically increase collection of sales and use tax revenues
from remote sellers within the reasonable boundaries of the dormant Commerce Clause.
At the time Bellas Hess was decided, the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was
formalistic, such that the Court was virtually required to hold that an in-state physical presence
was necessary to impose state sales and use taxes on a seller. When Quill was decided in 1992,
the Court’s jurisprudence in this area had dramatically changed providing for a more functional
and realistic analysis; nonetheless, the Quill Court upheld the physical presence rule under the
doctrine of stare decisis8 and practical concerns about the application of state sales and use taxes
to remote sellers. Now, not only is the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence flexible,
the economy of the nation has dramatically changed. This compelled the Court to reject the
physical presence rule and overturn Bellas Hess and Quill in Wayfair.
There are repeating legal issues in all three decisions, sometimes relied upon in the
majority opinion and sometimes by the dissenters. These include:
 whether formalism or functionalism should govern dormant Commerce Clause analysis;
 whether violations of the Due Process Clause and burdening interstate commerce are
similar or could be distinguished;
 whether the doctrine of stare decisis compels maintenance of the rule;
any state case addressing that issue. However, in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, the Court appeared to limit the
physical presence rule to sales and use taxes. 504 U.S. 298, 317, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed. 2d 91 (1992). (Swain I
2003) Other commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s lack of action in this area means that the physical
presence rule should be applied to other state taxes. (Murtha 2013) However, the majority of state courts have held
that the physical presence rule applies only to sales and use taxes and not to other types of state taxes. (Thimmesch
2011/2012) Because of the Wayfair decision, however, that issue is now moot.
3
U.S., No. 17-494 (June 21, 2018).
4
This article uses the term “remote sellers” to mean out-of-state sellers with no physical presence in a state, as
defined in National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 18
L.Ed. 2d 505 (1967), and its progeny.
5
U.S., No. 17-494 (June 21, 2018).
6
386 U.S. 753, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 18 L.Ed. 2d 505 (1967).
7
504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed. 2d 91 (1992).
8
Stare decisis is Latin for “to stand by decided matters.” (Meriam-Webster Law Dictionary 2018) The doctrine of
stare decisis provides a strong motivation to courts to apply and abide by precedent and not disturb settled issues.
While the doctrine does allow for change in certain situations, the courts consider (1) whether there has been a major
change in related areas of the law; (2) whether there has been a factual change in the economy, the culture,
technology, and other aspects of society; (3) whether the precedent is now unworkable; and (4) whether strong
reliance interests exist that would be harmed by a change in the law. (Swain II 2003)
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whether the absence of the physical presence rule would unduly burden remote sellers
with the administrative requirements of complying with state and local taxes;
 whether the rule resulted in tax distortion, unfairly penalized in-state sellers, and
constituted a judicially created tax shelter;
 whether the changes in technology and the economy have made the rule obsolete; and
 whether any or all of these issues should be left to Congress.
The Court’s changing analysis of the physical presence rule was also impacted by other cases
involving the dormant Commerce Clause’s effect on state taxation, especially Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady9 and National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization.10
This article examines the Court’s varying findings on the validity of the physical
presence rule from 1967 to today and predicts how the Wayfair ruling will change the analysis on
whether states’ taxation of remote sellers violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Establishment of the “Physical Presence” Rule
National Bellas Hess, Incorporated v. Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois
The physical presence rule originated in Bellas Hess.11 National Bellas Hess, Inc.
(“Bellas Hess”) was a mail order house that sold millions of dollars in goods to Illinois
residents.12 It was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Missouri. 13
Bellas Hess had no offices, distribution houses, sales houses, warehouses, or any other place of
business in Illinois.14 It had no personnel in Illinois to sell or take orders or to service the
merchandise it sold.15 It did not own any tangible property in Illinois and did not advertise in
newspapers or on billboards, radio, or television in Illinois. 16 The only contacts Bellas Hess had
with Illinois were through U.S. mail and common carrier.17 It sent catalogues by mail to Illinois
customers (as well as its other customers nationwide) twice a year and occasionally mailed
advertising flyers. 18 In order to purchase goods, customers mailed orders to Bellas Hess at its
Missouri plant, and Bellas Hess would fill the orders, shipping the goods by mail or common
carrier.19
The Illinois Department of Revenue sought to require Bellas Hess and similar remote
sellers to collect use taxes from its customers and remit them to the state under Section 3 of the

9

430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977).
430 U.S. 551, 97 S.Ct. 1386, 51 L.Ed.2d 631 (1977).
11
The Bellas Hess Court did not use the words “physical presence” to describe the rule. These words were used in
later cases. See, e.g., National Geographic, 430 U.S. at 556 (stating that appellant’s two offices and employees instate constituted “a much more substantial presence than the expression ‘slightest presence’ connotes.”); Quill, 504
U.S. at 314-315 (1992) (calling it the “physical-presence requirement” from Bellas Hess, which it described as a
“bright-line test.”)
12
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760-61 (J. Fortas, dissent) (“Its sales in Illinois amounted to $2,174,744 for the
approximately 15 months for which the taxes in issue in this case were assessed.”)
13
Id., 386 U.S. at 753-54.
14
Id., 386 U.S. at 754, quoting Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 164, 166-67 (1966).
15
Bellas Hess, quoting 34 Ill. 2d at 167.
16
Id.
17
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754.
18
Id.
19
Id., 386 U.S. at 754-55.
10
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Use Tax Act in effect at that time in Illinois.20 Under that section, “[e]ngaging in soliciting orders
within this State from users by means of catalogues or other advertising, whether such orders are
received or accepted within or without this State,” was enough to classify the seller as a “retailer
maintaining a place of business in this State.”21 In other words, under the statute, any retailer that
solicited orders in Illinois, whether physically located in Illinois or not, was deemed to maintain
a place of business in Illinois. These retailers, including Bellas Hess, were required to collect and
remit use taxes from its Illinois customers, provide receipts to their customers, keep detailed
records, and submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Department of Revenue and Illinois
courts, with the Illinois Secretary of State designated as their appointed agent for service of
process.22
After Bellas Hess failed to collect and remit the use tax, the Department sued to resolve
whether it was responsible for collecting and remitting the use tax. The trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of the Department for $93,242.18, representing taxes of $74,593.75
assessed under the Use Tax Act for the 15-month period, plus a 25% penalty of $18,648.43.23
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.24 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, Bellas Hess argued that the application of the Illinois statute against it violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and created an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce under the dormant Commerce Clause.25
In the majority opinion, the Court found that the tests for violations of the Due Process
Clause and unduly burdening interstate commerce were similar.26 The Court determined that a
state tax imposed on interstate commerce would be justified only to the extent that the interstate
business bears its share of the cost of the local government “whose protection it enjoys.”27 The
Court described the test for determining whether a state tax violates due process as “whether the
state has given anything for which it can ask return.”28 The Court determined that the same
question in the due process test could be applied to the power of a state to impose burdens of
collecting use tax on interstate sales.29 It found that in both tests, the Constitution required a
minimum connection between the state and the transaction it seeks to tax.30
The Bellas Hess Court outlined the previous instances in which it had upheld a state’s
right to impose a duty to collect a state use tax from an out-of-state seller: (1) when the out-ofstate seller had a local agent in the taxing state that arranged the sales31; (2) when a mail order
seller maintained local retail stores32; and (3) when the out-of-state seller had 10 employees
conducting continuous solicitation in one state who forwarded the orders from that state to
20

Id., 386 U.S. at 755, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. chap. 120, §439.2 (1965).
Id., quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. chap. 120, §439.2 (1965).
22
Id., 386 U.S. at 755-56.
23
Department of Revenue, 34 Ill.2d 164, 214 N.E.2d 755, 756 (1966).
24
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753.
25
Id., 386 U.S. at 756.
26
Id.
27
Id., quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253, 67 S. Ct. 274, 277, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265 (1946).
28
Bellas Hess, quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444, 61 S.Ct. 246, 250, 85 L.Ed. 2d 267 (1940).
29
Id., 386 U.S. at 756.
30
Bellas Hess, citing Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45, 74 S.Ct. 535, 539, 98 L.Ed. 744
(1954) and Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207-210,211, 80 S.Ct. 619, 621-622, 4 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1960).
31
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757, citing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 59 S.Ct. 376, 83 L.Ed.
488 (1939); General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 64 S.Ct. 1028, 88 L.Ed. 1309 (1944).
32
Bellas Hess, citing Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 61 S.Ct. 58, 85 L.Ed. 888 (1941); Nelson v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373, 61 S.Ct. 593, 85 L.Ed. 897 (1941).
21
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another state for shipment.33 In all of these cases, the Court noted, the out-of-state sellers
maintained personnel or tangible personal or real property in the taxing state. The Court
determined that it had never held that a state could impose a requirement that an out-of-state
seller collect use taxes if that seller’s only connection with customers in that state was by mail or
common carrier.34
Because Bellas Hess had no property or personnel of any kind in Illinois and its only
connections with its customers in Illinois were by mail and common carrier, the Court held that
Bellas Hess’s activities in Illinois were exclusively interstate and subject only to Congressional
regulation and not state taxes. 35
The Court also opined that, if Illinois were allowed to impose use tax burdens on Bellas
Hess, every other state, municipality, school district, and local taxing body could also do so.36
Such “local entanglements” were not unjustified under the Commerce Clause.37 The Court held
that the Illinois statute violated the Due Process Clause and placed an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.
Justice Fortas, joined by Justices Black and Douglas, dissented.38 He asserted that Court
precedent39 and “a realistic approach”40 to the facts required the Court to affirm the Illinois
Supreme Court.41 The dissent focused on the quantity of Bellas Hess’s sales in Illinois, the large
number of Illinois residents who received catalogues twice a year, and even greater number of
Illinois residents who received Bellas Hess’s flyers.42 Justice Fortas argued that Bellas Hess’s
advertising and sales solicitations were large-scale, systematic, and continuous, and constituted
exploitation of the Illinois consumer market.43
The dissent also argued that Bellas Hess offered credit to Illinois residents with which to
finance their purchases and a charge account, both of which required the applicant to provide
bank information.44 Justice Fortas opined that it would be reasonable to assume that Bellas Hess
either sold, assigned, or otherwise collected on its delinquent accounts, which would require the
company, its assignees, or representatives to conduct activities within the state.45 Bellas Hess’s
solicitations and the use of residents’ credit resources, which were dependent on the State’s

33

Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757-58, quoting Scripto.
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758 (“In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens on National in
this case, we would have to repudiate totally the sharp distinction which these and other decisions have drawn
between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, and those who do no more than
communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business. But this
basic distinction, which until now has been generally recognized by the state taxing authorities, is a valid one, and
we decline to obliterate it.”).
35
Id., 386 U.S. at 759 (“Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more exclusively interstate in
character than the mail order transactions here involved.”).
36
Id., 386 U.S. at 759-60.
37
Id., 386 U.S. at 760.
38
Id., 386 U.S. at 761-766 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
39
Scripto, supra, n. 30.
40
Here, Justice Fortas distinguished between the formalistic analysis conducted by the Bellas Hess majority and a
realistic analysis that took into account the extent of Bellas Hess’s involvement in the state.
41
Id., 386 U.S. at 760 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
42
Id.
43
Id., 386 U.S. at 761 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
44
Id., 386 U.S. at 761-62 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
45
Id., 386 U.S. at 762 (Fortas, J., dissenting)
34

21

Keane

banking and credit institutions, he argued, constituted a sufficient nexus46 with Illinois to require
Bellas Hess to comply with Illinois’ use tax collection requirements.47
Finally, Justice Fortas argued that excusing companies like Bellas Hess from the use tax
collection requirements of the state burdened and penalized in-state retailers required to collect
sales tax from their customers,48 and that any burden on Bellas Hess from compliance with
Illinois and local law was no greater than the burden on in-state retailers.49 Further, the dissent
noted that Illinois reimbursed remote sellers subject to the statute for their use tax collection
duties by providing a discount of two percent or $5, whichever larger, each calendar year, which
meant that Bellas Hess would be compensated for the administrative costs of collecting the tax
and remitting it to the state.50
Important Cases Decided Between Bellas Hess and Quill
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided two cases that further analyzed state taxation under
the dormant Commerce Clause, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady51 and National Geographic
Society v. California Board of Equalization.52 Neither of these cases dealt specifically with
sellers that had no physical presence within the taxing state, but they developed the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence in related ways.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady
At the time Bellas Hess was decided, the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
included a formalistic blanket prohibition on any state taxation imposed directly on interstate
transactions, which was established in Freeman v. Hewit,53 and the Spector rule, developed in
Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor54 in reliance on Freeman and Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone.55
The Spector rule stood for the proposition that a state’s taxation of purely interstate commerce on
the “privilege of doing business” in the state was unconstitutional. 56 In Complete Auto, the Court
reconsidered both of these rules.
The Complete Auto Court determined that, notwithstanding the apparent adoption of
absolute immunity for interstate commerce from state taxation in Freeman, the Court had moved
46

Justice Fortas defined sufficient nexus as “ ‘Some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.’ ” Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 765 (Fortas, J., dissenting), quoting
Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344, 74 S.Ct. 535, 539, 98 L.Ed. 744 (1954).
47
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 761-62 (dissent, J. Fortas) (“There should be no doubt that this large-scale, systematic,
continuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market is a sufficient ‘nexus’ to require Bellas Hess
to collect from Illinois customers and to remit the use tax, especially when coupled with the use of the credit
resources of residents of Illinois, dependent as that mechanism is upon the State’s banking and credit institutions.”
48
Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 763.
49
Id., 386 U.S. at 766.
50
Id., 386 U.S. at 764, n. 7 (Fortas, J., dissenting), quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. chap. 2, §439.9 (1965).
51
430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977).
52
430 U.S. 551, 97 S.Ct. 1386, 51 L.Ed.2d 631 (1977).
53
329 U.S. 249, 67 S.Ct. 274, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265 (1946). The Bellas Hess Court cited Freeman for the proposition that
the taxation of interstate commerce by a state can be justified only if designed to make that commerce “ ‘bear a fair
share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys.’ ” Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756, quoting
Freeman, 329 U.S. at 253.
54
340 U.S. 602, 71 S.Ct. 508, 95 L.Ed. 2d 573 (1951).
55
335 U.S. 80, 68 S.Ct. 1475, 92 L.Ed.2d 1832 (1948).
56
Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 284.
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towards permissibility of state taxation based on actual effect rather than formalistic
requirements.57 In support, the Court described its decision in Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle,58
in which it found that merely doing business in interstate commerce does not exempt
corporations from state taxation, and foreign corporations conducting exclusively interstate
business can be subject to state tax when the tax relates to the corporation’s local activities and
benefits and protections that have been provided by the state to the corporation for which the
state is justified in seeking a fair and reasonable return.59 The Court also rejected the Spector rule
as unduly formalistic and instead adopted a four-prong test for Commerce Clause challenges to
state taxation of interstate commerce.60
The appellant in that case, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. (“Complete Auto”) was engaged
in the business of transporting cars by truck to Mississippi dealers. 61 The Mississippi State Tax
Commission assessed Complete Auto a tax on the “privilege of doing business” within the state
equal to five percent of the gross income of that business to be collected by adding it to the gross
sales price for collection at the time the sales price is collected.62 The company argued that,
under the Spector rule, the application of the tax on the privilege of doing business was
unconstitutional because its activities in the state were purely interstate commerce.63
The Court rejected that argument and determined that the Spector rule created a situation
in which “magic words or labels” in a tax statute, specifically that statute imposed the tax on the
“privilege of doing business,” could result in an otherwise constitutional tax being rejected under
the dormant Commerce Clause.64 It stated that the Spector rule operated only as a drafting rule,
which distracted courts and parties from inquiring into whether the tax placed an undue burden
on interstate commerce. 65 The Court determined that the rule demonstrated an underlying
philosophy that interstate commerce had free trade immunity from state taxation. 66 The Court
rejected the formalism of the Spector rule and overturned the cases that resulted in this rule.67
To replace the Spector rule, the Court established a four-prong test to determine whether
state taxation of interstate commerce met the requirements of the Commerce Clause. 68 If the tax:
(1) was applied to an activity that had a substantial nexus with the state; (2) was fairly
apportioned; (3) did not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) was fairly related to
the services provided by the state, the tax was constitutional. 69 This four-prong test continues to
be applied in current dormant Commerce Clause cases involving state taxation.
57

Id., 430 U.S. at 281. This finding mirrored Justice Fortas’ argument in his Bellas Hess dissent that formalism
should give way to a “realistic approach.” Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
58
421 U.S. 100, 108, 95 S.Ct. 1538, 1543, 44 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975).
59
Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 287-288, quoting Colonial Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 108. See also Goldberg v. Sweet Gte
Sprint Communications Corporation v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259, 109 S.Ct. 582, 102 L.Ed.2d 607 (1989) (Complete
Auto specifically rejected “the view that the States cannot tax interstate commerce, while at the same time placing
limits on state taxation of interstate commerce.”)
60
Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
61
Id., 430 U.S. at 276.
62
Id., 430 U.S. at 275-76.
63
Id., 430 U.S. at 277-78.
64
Id., 430 U.S. at 284, quoting Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 79 S.Ct. 411, 3 L.Ed. 2d 450
(1959).
65
Id., 430 U.S. at 285.
66
Id., 430 U.S. at 278.
67
Id., 430 U.S. at 288-89.
68
Id., 430 U.S. at 279.
69
Id.
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National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization
In National Geographic, the Court held that the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause were not violated when California imposed a requirement on the National Geographic
Society, which sold maps, books, and other items to California residents by mail order, to collect
and remit use taxes.70 National Geographic had two offices and employees in California that
solicited advertising for its magazine, but were not involved in any activities related to the mail
order sales. 71 The Court held that the presence of these offices and personnel provided a
sufficient nexus for the state to collect and remit use taxes even on sales to which the offices
were not connected.72 The Court distinguished Bellas Hess because there the seller had no
physical presence of any kind in Illinois, unlike National Geographic in California. 73
The National Geographic case clarified the Bellas Hess ruling by showing that any physical
presence, whether related to the activities of the seller that were subject to state tax or not, was
sufficient to bring that seller within the state’s taxing jurisdiction.
The First Direct Challenge to the Physical Presence Rule
Quill Corporation v. North Dakota by and through Heitkamp
In 1992, 25 years after Bellas Hess and 15 years after Complete Auto and National
Geographic, the Supreme Court revisited the physical presence rule. On facts virtually identical
to Bellas Hess, the Court considered whether an out-of-state mail-order house with no in-state
property, employees, or agents, that is, no physical presence, was subject to state law imposing a
use tax on goods purchased state residents in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota by and through
Heitkamp.74
Quill was a Delaware corporation that sold office equipment and supplies and had offices
and warehouses in Illinois, California, and Georgia.75 It had no physical presence in North
Dakota, where it solicited sales through catalogues and flyers, advertisements in national
magazines, and telephone calls. 76 It was the sixth largest office supply vendor in North Dakota,
with almost $1 million in sales and 3,000 customers in North Dakota, and delivered all of the
items sold to North Dakota residents by mail and common carrier.77
North Dakota attempted to impose a duty to collect and remit a use tax on Quill under a
state statute that required every “retailer” maintaining a place of business in the state to collect
and remit the tax.78 “Retailer” was defined in the North Dakota statute as “every person who

70

National Geographic, 430 U.S. at 556.
Id., 430 U.S. at 552.
72
Id., 430 U.S. at 556, 561 (“Here the Society’s two offices, without regard to the nature of their activities, had the
advantage of the same municipal services, fire and police protection, and the like as they would have had if their
activities … included assistance to the mail-order operations that generated the use taxes.”).
73
Id., 430 U.S. at 560.
74
504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed. 2d 91 (1992).
75
Quill, 504 U.S. at 302.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id., quoting N.D.Cent. Code §57-40.2-07 (Supp. 1991).
71
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engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.”79 “[R]egular or
systematic solicitation” was defined as three or more advertisements in a 12-month period.80
North Dakota, by its tax commissioner, filed an action to compel Quill to pay taxes,
interest, and penalties on sales to state residents made after July 1, 1987.81 The trial court ruled in
Quill’s favor, citing Bellas Hess in finding that the state did not show that it spent its revenues
for the benefit of Quill’s sales in North Dakota; thus, there was no nexus with the state.82
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the huge changes
in social, commercial, economic, and “legal innovations” since 1967, particularly technical
changes and increases in the volume of mail order business, made Bellas Hess obsolete.83 The
“legal innovations” mentioned by the court included the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause analyses in Complete Auto84 and National Geographic.85
The North Dakota Supreme Court also asserted that Supreme Court cases following
Bellas Hess did not require physical presence for the minimum contacts test for due process.86 It
argued that instead the Court has considered whether the out-of-state retailer has purposefully
directed its activities at a state’s residents in determining whether the retailer has minimum
contacts with the state.87 The court determined that Quill’s lack of physical presence in the state
was not fatal to the state’s attempt to impose a requirement to collect and remit use taxes on
Quill. 88 The court ruled that the use tax as applied to Quill satisfied the four-prong test in
Complete Auto and did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause.89
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme
Court, finding that the dormant Commerce Clause analysis in Bellas Hess was not obsolete.90
First, though the Bellas Hess Court described the Due Process Clause test and the Commerce
Clause test as “similar,” 91 the Quill Court distinguished them, finding they each developed
distinct limits on the state taxing powers and differed in several fundamental ways. 92 The Court
determined that while a State may have the authority to tax a remote seller under the Due Process
Clause, the tax may violate the Commerce Clause.93
Overturning Bellas Hess’s Due Process Analysis
The Court asserted that in Bellas Hess, due process required a seller’s physical presence
in a state before the state could impose a tax on that retailer.94 However, it found that the Court’s
79
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jurisprudence on the Due Process Clause had evolved since 1967 based on the Court’s continual
development of the standards of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.95 It determined that the
relevant inquiry under the Due Process Clause is whether a defendant had minimum contacts
with a state so that the suit against the defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.96 In a due process analysis, the Court no longer relied on formalistic tests
that required a defendant's actual presence within the state.97 Instead, the proper analysis was
more flexible and considered whether a remote seller’s contacts with the state made it reasonable
to subject it to suit in the state’s courts.98 The Court found that this flexible analysis had been
extended to all issues of state jurisdiction over out-of-state entities and individuals. 99 Thus, on
Quill’s due process arguments, the Court found that Quill had purposefully directed its business
activities toward North Dakota residents, the magnitude of those contacts was sufficient for due
process purposes, and the use tax was related to the benefits that Quill received from the state.100
Thus, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not bar North Dakota’s imposition of the
duty to collect and remit use tax on it and overturned Bellas Hess on this point.101
Sustaining Bellas Hess’s Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
While striking down Bellas Hess’ analysis under the Due Process Clause, the Quill Court
upheld Bellas Hess on the dormant Commerce Clause issue. It determined that the principles of
stare decisis recommended a continuation of the physical presence rule. 102 Many commentators
believe that the doctrine of stare decisis was the central reason for the Court’s decision to retain
the physical presence rule. (Swain I 2003; Swain II 2003; Rothfeld 1992; Hellerstein and
Hellerstein 1998 and 2002; Pomp and McIntyre 1996) This is supported by the majority’s
admission that modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not have required the same result
if raised for the first time in Quill,103 and the concurrence, in which Justice Scalia, joined by
Justices Kennedy and Thomas, argued that the matter should have been decided simply on the
doctrine of stare decisis.104
In upholding the physical presence rule, the Court cited Complete Auto’s four-part test to
determine whether a state tax should be sustained under the Commerce Clause.105 The Court
distinguished the minimum contacts test applied in the due process analysis from the substantial
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nexus requirement in the Complete Auto test, finding that a business can have minimum contacts
with a taxing state required by the Due Process Clause, but lack the substantial nexus with the
state required by the Commerce Clause. 106 The Court also conflated the physical presence rule
with the first prong of the Complete Auto test, asserting that the physical presence rule meant that
a remote seller whose only contact with the taxing state was through mail or common carrier
lacked the required substantial nexus.107 In other words, at least in the sales and use tax context,
the first prong of the Complete Auto test, substantial nexus required physical presence.
While the Court admitted that it had abandoned formalistic Commerce Clause analysis in
Complete Auto, it determined that the bright line rule requiring physical presence furthered the
ends of the Commerce Clause and created a safe harbor for remote vendors whose only
connection with the taxing state was by mail or common carrier.108 The Court admitted that the
physical presence rule appeared “artificial at its edges,” but asserted that this artificiality was
more than offset by the benefits of having a bright-line rule. 109 It determined that the rule clearly
established the limits on states’ right to tax out-of-state vendors, reduced litigation, and
encouraged settled expectations and investment.110 It opined that the growth of mail-order
businesses after Bellas Hess was due, at least in part, to the bright-line physical presence rule. 111
Finally, the majority placed the responsibility of changing the Bellas Hess rule, if deemed
appropriate, in the hands of Congress.112
The Dissent
Justice White was the sole dissenter.113 He agreed with the majority in overturning the
Due Process Clause portion of Bellas Hess, but believed that the Court should have overturned
the entire case.114 Justice White argued that the majority’s finding that the due process minimum
contacts test was different from the significant nexus prong of the Complete Auto test was
completely novel and had never been found before by the Court.115 He asserted that the cases
from which the Complete Auto substantial nexus requirement was derived demonstrate that it
came from the due process fairness inquiry, not from a completely separate notion of nexus
requiring a physical presence in the taxing state.116
Justice White further argued that Complete Auto disavowed the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause in Bellas Hess that prohibited states from taxing interstate commerce and
cemented the proposition that states are not barred from taxing interstate commerce. 117 In
addition, the Court’s ruling in National Geographic decoupled the notion of a transactional
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nexus from the Commerce Clause inquiry and repudiated Bellas Hess’s free trade rationale for
remote sellers. 118
Justice White argued that the current economy did not require a remote seller to maintain
property or personnel in a state to do business there.119 He questioned what “physical presence”
actually meant and whether Quill’s activities in North Dakota really showed that it had no
physical presence.120 He predicted that determining the meaning of “physical presence” would
result in an increase in litigation.121 Remote sellers like Quill still relied on the commercial
benefits offered by the state in which they do business, including banking laws, the court system
(for collections cases), waste disposal for the garbage created by mail order solicitations and
packages, and consumer protection laws enacted for the protection of both consumer and
vendor.122 Does this constitute physical presence sufficient for Commerce Clause purposes?
He stated bluntly that the physical presence requirement was anachronistic in economic
terms, illogical, and unfair.123 He disagreed with perpetuating a rule that created an interstate tax
shelter for mail order businesses, which at that time was a $180 billion-a-year industry, but
provided no advantage to their competitors.124
Justice White argued that retaining the physical presence rule on stare decisis grounds
was not necessary and fears that states would impose retroactive tax liability absent the rule were
groundless.125 He dismissed the value of industry reliance on the physical presence rule,
particularly in light of the changing Commerce Clause analysis in recent cases. 126 Quill’s
reliance, in particular, he found unreasonable, especially in light of Quill’s refusal to pay the tax
and then challenge it in court.127
Finally, Justice White argued that, while Congress should act in this area, the Court’s
continued adherence to the Bellas Hess decision in light of recent cases and economic realities
was not justified. 128
The Second Direct Challenge to the Physical Presence Rule
Since 1992 when the Quill Court upheld the physical presence rule, commentators have
recommended that the Court revisit the issue and reject the rule. (Swain II 2003) In 2015, in his
concurrence to Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, Justice Kennedy urged his colleagues and
the legal system to find a case in which the Court could reconsider Quill and Bellas Hess because
of the harm and unfairness caused to the states by their inability to collect revenue and changes
in technology and consumer sophistication. 129 Not long after, South Dakota appealed its state
supreme court’s ruling in its suit against Wayfair, Inc. and others to the U.S. Supreme Court,
asking the Court to invalidate the physical presence rule.
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South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.
Wayfair130 was decided on June 21, 2018, 26 years after Quill and 51 years after Bellas
Hess. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected the physical presence rule and overruled
Quill and Bellas Hess. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices
Thomas, Ginsberg, Alito, and Gorsuch.131
In 2016, a short time after Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Direct Marketing, South
Dakota enacted an Act in S. 106132 with the express goal of judicially challenging the physical
presence rule and the state’s inability to tax remote sellers, which it had determined was causing
a decrease in critical funding for state and local services.133 (Howsare 2017) The Act was dubbed
a “kill-Quill law” by some commentators. (Howsare 2017) South Dakota also declared an
emergency based on the revenue lost from its inability to tax remote sellers, which it argued was
necessary to support the state government and public institutions.134
In response to the concerns raised in Bellas Hess and Quill that subjecting remote sellers
to sales and use taxes could result in an undue administrative burden, 135 the Act was specifically
limited in its application to remote sellers that delivered more than $100,000 of goods or services
in state each year or engaged in 200 or more in-state transactions. 136 In addition, South Dakota is
a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement developed by a number of states in
2000 to simplify and modernize sales and use tax administration to substantially reduce the
burden of sales and use tax compliance, including by simplifying the payment of both state and
local taxes. 137 This membership would provide remote sellers with resources to simplify the
payment of state and local taxes.138 The Act also provided for a stay of its effect until
constitutional issues could be determined and prevented retroactive application, another attempt
to quell the Court’s concerns.139
South Dakota filed a declaratory judgment action against respondents Wayfair, Inc.,
Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg, Inc., all remote sellers with substantial sales and transactions
in the state, arguing that these sellers should be required to collect sales tax from their in-state
sales under the Act.140 Both the trial court and state supreme court granted summary judgment to
respondents, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 141
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The Court determined that Quill was flawed.142 The Court set forth the history of the
dormant Commerce Clause, particularly as related to state taxation of interstate commerce, in a
sweeping analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence in the area since the U.S. Constitution was
enacted.143 It detailed the criticism leveled against the physical presence rule.144 It found that the
reasons the Quill Court gave for rejecting the application of the physical presence rule to the
minimum contacts test of the Due Process Clause equally applied to rejecting it for the
substantial nexus test in the Commerce Clause. 145
The Court scorned the finding in Quill that the complexities of complying with multiple
state and local taxes might unduly burden sellers with no physical presence in a state, particularly
as out-of-state sellers with a physical presence in a state were required to shoulder that burden. 146
The physical presence rule was a poor means to address compliance costs faced by remote sellers
that do business in multiple states, and other aspects of Commerce Clause doctrine could deal
with any potential burdens on interstate commerce better and more accurately than the physical
presence rule. 147
The Court also found that the physical presence rule interfered with states’ lawful
authority to collect taxes and perform critical public functions.148 In addition, the physical
presence rule put sellers with a physical presence in a state at a competitive disadvantage and
resulted in a judicially created tax shelter for remote sellers. 149 It found that the rule produced
distorted business decision-making by creating an incentive for remote sellers to avoid physical
presence in a state.150 It determined that the rule undermined public confidence in the tax system
and was unfair and unjust to states, competitors of remote sellers that had a physical presence,
and customers who paid sales tax in the state.151
The Court also determined that the Quill Court ignored the rejection of formalism in the
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the embrace of a more functional analysis of
market dynamics.152 Quill was wrongly decided even with regard to the less complex economic
realities in 1992. 153 The Court also dismissed as unsound the argument that the physical presence
rule is easy to apply, finding that the prevalence of e-commerce made determining what
constitutes physical presence more and more difficult.154 In light of modern day e-commerce the
definition of physical presence was unclear, particularly given the virtual presence that online
marketers have in customers’ computers and smart phones through apps and cookies and in data
storage facilities located in-state.155 The Court predicted that, given present day economic
realities, if left to continue, the physical presence rule would result in increasing litigation on the
meaning of “physical presence.”156
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The Court dismissed the idea that the doctrine of stare decisis required it to uphold Quill,
finding that stare decisis could not support the physical presence rule because the rule
unconstitutionally infringed on states’ sovereign powers.157 While the Court found that reliance
interests could be legitimate considerations in deciding whether to uphold Court precedent, the
arguments for reliance based on the physical presence rule were not.158
The Court conceded that Congress had the authority to reject or alter the physical
presence rule; however, Congress did not have the authority to change a constitutional default
rule established by the Court.159 Further, given that the “false constitutional premise” of the
physical presence rule was judicially created and through it the Court was limiting the lawful
authority of the states, the Court could not rely on Congress to change the law but must reject the
rule itself. 160 Indeed, while Congress had introduced legislation in 2018 to overturn the physical
presence rule and at other times during the five decades it was in effect, it did not pass it.161
(Swain II 2003)
The Court discounted the difficulties that small businesses and start-ups may have with
complying with state and local taxes.162 It determined that software and other systems have been
and will continue to be developed to help businesses comply. 163 Further, the South Dakota Act,
by its terms, applied only to remote sellers doing a large amount of business in South Dakota.164
In addition, the Court found that in the absence of the physical presence rule, the dormant
Commerce Clause and the four-pronged Complete Auto test would continue to protect businesses
from any actual undue burden on interstate commerce.165
After overruling Quill and Bellas Hess and invalidating the physical presence rule, the
Court determined that there was a substantial nexus between the activities of the respondents and
South Dakota; therefore, the Act passed the substantial nexus prong of the Complete Auto test.166
With regard to the remaining three prongs of that test, which the parties had not litigated or
briefed, the Court determined that it need not resolve them. 167 On that basis, the Court vacated
the decision of the state supreme court and remanded the case for further proceedings. 168
However, it also listed features of the South Dakota Act that appeared to be designed to prevent
undue burdens or discrimination on interstate commerce: (1) the Act provides a safe harbor for
businesses with limited or intermittent sales in the state; (2) the language of Act prevented
retroactive application; and (3) South Dakota is a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement.169
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The Concurrences
Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch separately concurred.170 Justice Thomas reflected
that he should have joined Justice White’s dissent in Quill.171 He asserted that the whole of the
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence could not be justified rationally. 172 Justice Gorsuch
also quoted Justice White’s dissent with approval, opining that the physical presence rule created
a discriminatory tax shelter for remote sellers.173 He also hinted that he disagreed with aspects of
the dormant Commerce Clause, but left that as “questions for another day.”174
The Dissent
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissented from
the majority opinion. 175 Justice Roberts agreed with the majority that Bellas Hess was wrongly
decided176; however, he argued that rejecting the physical presence rule could disrupt the
economy. 177 He asserted that the doctrine of stare decisis is heightened in dormant Commerce
Clause cases because Congress has the power to decide the underlying issue.178 He noted that
three bills on this issue were pending in Congress and opined that Congress could better resolve
the situation than the Court.179 He cited to information that states are already able to collect 80
percent of the tax revenue that would be available without the physical presence rule, 180 and
argued that rejecting the physical presence rule would impose costs on remote sellers, with the
burden falling mainly on small businesses. 181
The Potential Consequences of Wayfair
The potential consequences of the Wayfair decision are speculative, though some are
highly probable. First, rather than settle the law in this area, Wayfair will likely lead to increased
litigation as more states impose duties to collect sales and use taxes on remote sellers. Some
states may try to expand the substantial nexus requirement from the limits in the South Dakota
law to increase tax revenues. Remote sellers eager to limit substantial nexus will file numerous
lawsuits to test states’ unique sales and use tax laws. As the Supreme Court is unlikely to further
clarify the limits of substantial nexus anytime soon, the minimum requirements are likely to be
the subject of years of litigation in the lower courts before the issue is settled.
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Second, Congress may choose to address the issue through legislation, despite its past
failure to do so even in the face of encouragement by the Supreme Court.182 As noted by Chief
Justice Roberts in his Wayfair dissent, three bills were pending in Congress on this issue at the
time of the decision.183 However, instead of sidelining this issue in Congress, as he feared,
Wayfair may push remote sellers to lobby for legislation preventing states from imposing these
taxes on them and may push states to seek Congressional guidance on the limits of such taxation.
Decisive congressional action could prevent much of the anticipated litigation on the limits of the
substantial nexus requirement; of course, there is no guarantee that Congress will act.
Third, many states may simply copy South Dakota’s statute to avoid litigation. Wayfair
provides three safe harbors to assist states in meeting the substantial nexus requirement and
provide remote sellers with “a reasonable degree of protection.” 184 First, the Wayfair majority
cited with approval the limitations on the applicability of the South Dakota law, gross revenue of
over $100,000 and 200 or more separate transactions. 185 Second, the South Dakota law expressly
prohibits retroactive application.186 Third, the Court cited South Dakota’s membership in the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“Agreement”) with approval. 187 Lower courts are
likely to find that state statutes that include the same or higher limits and prohibit retroactive
application in states that are members of the Agreement meet the requirements for substantial
nexus, fulfilling the first prong of the Complete Auto test.
It is less likely that there will be significant litigation brought under the remaining three
prongs of the Complete Auto test – whether the tax is fairly apportioned, whether it discriminates
against interstate commerce, and whether it is fairly related to services provided by the state.
Numerous cases applying Complete Auto to other types of state taxes have established settled
rules to help states navigate these waters.
To comply with the fair apportionment requirement,188 the state tax must be both
internally consistent189 and externally consistent.190 If the law requires the remote seller to collect
only the sales or use taxes imposed on sales made to residents within its borders, the tax is likely
to be considered fairly apportioned. Internal consistency would exist because, if other states
imposed identical sales taxes only on sales made within their borders, there would be no double
taxation. External consistency would also exist because the state would tax only sales made by
the remote seller to state residents.
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To prevent discrimination of interstate commerce, the state must avoid making
distinctions in applying the law to in-state and remote sellers. If an identical tax burden is placed
on both remote and in-state sellers – the same amount of tax, the same collection duties, the same
reporting and recordkeeping requirements, etc. – the courts will likely find that the tax does not
discriminate against interstate commerce.191
To be reasonably related to services provided by the state, the measure of the tax must be
in proportion to the taxpayer’s activities in the state, such as a percentage of the monetary
amount of sales made to state residents by the taxpayer. 192
If a state’s law remains within the safe harbors in Wayfair for the substantial nexus prong
and complies with the three additional requirements in Complete Auto, it is highly unlikely that
the law will be found to discriminate against interstate commerce.
Finally, following Wayfair, state sales and use tax statutes may become more uniform
and collection less onerous. The Agreement is intended to help states simplify and streamline
sales and use tax administration and reduce the burden of compliance. 193 It provides free
assistance of certified service providers and free software to help sellers comply with sales and
use tax laws and assist in audits, and sellers who use those services are immune from many types
of liability. 194 Given the Court’s positive response to the Agreement, more states are likely to
join, making uniformity and ease of collection more likely.
Conclusion
Over the past 51 years, the Supreme Court’s development of dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence for the application of states’ sales and use taxes to remote sellers has been blind to
the dramatic changes to the economy during that period. When the Supreme Court decided
Bellas Hess in 1967, based on the formalistic jurisprudence of the day, states’ authority to
impose state sales and use taxes on sales made by sellers in interstate commerce was flatly and
completely denied through the physical presence rule. Further, at that time sales by remote
sellers were not a large part of the economy, meaning that states’ revenues were only minimally
impacted by the rule. However, by 1977, the Court recognized in Complete Auto that a more
realistic interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause relating to state taxation was necessary,
and formalistic analyses was rejected. The Quill Court skirted this change in the law and upheld
the formalistic flat denial imposed by the physical presence rule on stare decisis and other
grounds, notwithstanding the major changes in the mail order industry that had been made by
that time. Finally, in Wayfair, the Supreme Court struck down the physical presence rule,
restoring equity to the application of sales and use taxes and recognizing states’ sovereignty and
191
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authority to tax commerce carried on within their boundaries. This decision will provide states
with the means to increase their sales and use tax revenues from remote sellers within the
reasonable boundaries of the dormant Commerce Clause, but will likely result in increased
litigation as states and remote sellers test the boundaries of substantial nexus. In addition,
Congress will be under increased pressure from interest groups to clarify states’ ability to impose
sales and use tax collection duties on remote sellers. Finally, more states are likely to join the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement based on the Court’s tacit approval, which may result
in greater uniformity in states’ laws and reduced burdens of compliance by remote sellers.
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